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Abstract
The great Islamic mass rally which well known as “Aksi Bela Islam (Defending 
Islam action) 212” in Indonesia has always been claimed as the triumph of 
Islamic activism. This action continue to be voiced through social media 
such as Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, and so forth with the jargon “ 212 spirit “. 
The voluminous actions of “Aksi Bela Islam 212” sound like an authoritative 
propaganda jargon which are exhaled to spread the Islamic identity through the 
internet. Along with the proliferation of online Islamic activism, some major 
questions emerge about: (1) whether online religious discourse is an authoritative 
source that gives Muslim society an authority in religious propaganda; (2) to 
what extent the proliferation of online Islamic activism has shaped the new 
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Islamic propaganda authority? The objective of this article is to examine the 
discourse of Islamic activism in the online public sphere which makes the 
internet and online social media as a new vehicle in the transformation of 
traditional-modern Islamic propaganda authority for technologically literate 
generation. The article highlights some transformations of traditional religious 
propaganda authority to the new one which appropriated with the technological 
advancement. Using political sociology approach, this article will maps an 
Islamic online activism, which is termed as Islamic clicktivism, and its relation 
to the religious propaganda authority. The finding of this article reveals that 
Islamic clicktivism can be an authoritative method in shaping religious and 
political discourses. Finally, this article argues that Islamic social movement in 
the millennial age – especially in the post 212 movement – has consistency to 
play a role in political contestation through the Islamic clicktivism.  
Gerakan aksi masal Islam yang dikenal dengan Aksi Bela Islam di Indonesia 
selalu diklaim sebagai kemenangan aktivisme Islam. Menyusul Aksi Bela Islam 
dalam ranah gerakan sosial, wacana serupa juga disuarakan melalui gerakan 
aktivisme secara daring yang disebarkan melalui berbagai media social seperti 
Facebook, Twitter dan Istagram dengan jargo “spirit 212”. Aksi berjilid-jilid dari 
Aksi Bela Islam ini terdengan seakan menjadi jargon propaganda otoritatif yang 
dihembuskan untuk menyebarkan identitas Islam melalui internet. Seiring 
dengan fenomena proliferasi gerakan-gerakan Islam daring tersebut, beberapa 
pertanyaan muncul: pertama, apakah diskursus keagamaan daring menjadi 
sumber otoritatif yang memberikan otoritas kepada masyarkat Muslim   dalam 
hal propaganda agama? Kedua, sejauh mana proliferasi aktivisme Islam daring 
membentuk otoritas propaganda keagamaan baru? Sasaran dari artikel ini 
adalah menguji wacana aktivisme Islam di ruang public daring yang menjadikan 
internet  dan media social daring sebagai kendaraan baru dalam transformasi 
otoritas propaganda keagamaan dari tradisional ke modern bagi kalangan melek 
milenial yang melek teknologi. Artikel ini menyoroti beberapa trasnformasi 
propaganda keagamaan tradisional menuju modern yang disesuaikan dengan 
perkembangan teknologi. Dengan menggunakan pendekatan sosiologi-
politik, artikel ini memetakan aktivisme Islam daring, yang diistilahkan 
dengan Islamic clicktivism, dan hubungannnya dengan otoritas propaganda 
keagamaan. Temuan artikel ini menunjukkan bahwa kliktifisme Islam dapat 
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menjadi metode otoritatif dalam membentuk wacana keagamaan dan politik 
sekaligus. Pada akhirnya artikel ini menegaskan bahwa gerakan social Islam di 
era milenial – khususnya pasca gerakan 212 –secara konsisten mengambil peran 
dalam kontestasi politik identitas dengan menggunakan kliktifisme Islam. 
Keywords: Aksi Bela Islam; Religious authority; Clicktivism; Populism
Introduction
The statement of former Jakarta governor Basuki Tjahaya Purnama 
(a.k.a. Ahok) has triggered a voluminious defending Islam actions in 
Indonesia.  The actions began in late 2016 and they continued until 
2018. This rage caused by  Ahok’s speech during a working visit and 
the socialization of the provincial government program to Pramuka 
Island in Kepulauan Seribu Jakarta on 27 September 2016. The speech 
became a heated discussion soon after Buni Yani, a youtuber, uploaded 
the video by commenting that the video has insulted the Quran, the 
Holy Book of Muslims.1 The short video is then spreaded by hundreds 
of netizens in various social media or online short message senders such 
as Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, WhatsApp, Line, and so forth. This 
video then successfully triggered angers among the Muslim community 
with the presence of rage postings: either in the form of pictures, photos, 
statuses, or brief comments on various social media platforms. A series of 
demonstrations followed the post-dissemination of Ahok’s video.2 In mid-
October 2016, a group of people gathered in front of Jakarta’s city hall 
to protest Ahok’s statement which insulted Muslims. The demonstration 
1 Ahmad Najib Burhani, “Aksi Bela Islam: Konservatisme dan Fragmentasi Otoritas 
Keagamaan,” Maarif 11, No. 2 (December 2016), 17-18
2 Ari Ganjar Herdiansah, et.al., “The Islam Defence Action: A Challenge of Islamic 
Movement to Democratic Transition in the Post 2014 Indonesia,” Wacana 20, No. 2 (2017), 
62-65.
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has continued on November 4, 2016, December 2, 2016, February 21, 
2017, March 3, 2017, and May 5, 2017 with a larger mass.
Looking deeply at the process of formation of this movement of Aksi 
Bela Islam, there is a pattern that is depicted in the action as a social 
movement. The pattern begins with an action of propaganda through the 
sails of technological devices, which is followed by supportive comments 
on the propaganda, and ends in mass mobilization for a real social 
movement for a purpose. This action is claimed to be attended by millions 
of people from all over Indonesia. The participants also claim that their 
coming to the capital city is voluntarily to voice one thing, namely justice 
for Muslims and Islam. Nevertheless, amidst the protesters in Jakarta, the 
action did not receive an official support from two mainstream Islamic 
organizations in Indonesia; Muhammadiyah and Nahdhatul Ulama. 
These two mainstream Islamic organizations seem to lose their authority 
as an institution that shapes Muslim religious attitudes and actions during 
the Ahok case in Indonesia. The Islamic Defense Action also indicates 
that there is a growing trend of new authorities in Indonesia which is 
capable of directing the actions of Indonesian Muslim community in 
addition to the Muhammadiyah and NU.
Some studies suggest that the Islamic Defense Action is closely related 
to the political moment. Greg Fealey considers that the incident of 
Islamic Defense Action in the Ahok case is a setback for political diversity 
in Indonesia. The Islamic Defense action is present to revive the battle 
of primordialism and the identity between the “native” and “non-native” 
Indonesians to promote their privileged position among Muslims as the 
majority and is regarded to have the authority of Indonesian politics. 
Moreover, the Islamic Defense Action was carried out prior to the 
democratic election moment for the Governor of DKI Jakarta. Ahok’s 
incident certainly has serious consequences for Indonesian society; 
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Indonesia must rethink its claims as a moderate Muslim democracy. 3 
Meanwhile, Merlyna Lim argues that amid the freedom of information, 
all people can easily argue. Assisted with technological developments, 
the opinions expressed will be easily spread to other communities so as 
to trigger differences of opinion. This disagreement resulted in a strong 
polarization resulting in a threat to democracy by bringing the patterns 
of the tribal paradigm. Both camps (Ahok’s supporters and Ahok’s 
Opponents) make a clear demarcation between anti-Pancasila and 
anti-Islam, which in Lim’s terms is called an algorithmic enclave. This 
algorithmic enclave is an ongoing trend during identity battles occurring in 
online social media because people easily mobilize cyberspace by building 
deconstructive opinions for their political identity opponents. 4 Fealey’s 
and Lim’s studies emphasize a similar thesis; namely the strengthening 
of post-democratic political identity contestation in Indonesia which is 
sometimes still colored by emotional outbursts by each identity that fights 
with carrying primordial propaganda. However, Lim simply concentrates 
on studying online social movements that carry different characteristics 
and propaganda tools from social movements in the early days of reform, 
while Fealey focuses on mass movements capable of being mobilized with 
religious propaganda. Nevertheless,these two studies may lead to a new 
question; what kind of religious authority can play the online and offline 
identity fight? How such authority is able to be present in the midst of 
two mainstream Islamic organizations: Muhammadiyah and NU? Who 
are the new actors appearing in the midst of the movement claimed as 
the super-peaceful and democratic Islamic social movement? What is the 
3 Greg Fealy, “Bigger than Ahok: Explaining the 2 December Mass Rally,” Indonesia 
at Melbourne, last modified December 7, 2016, accessed March 29, 2017, http://
indonesiaatmelbourne.unimelb.edu.au/bigger-than-ahok-explaining-jakartas-2-december-
mass-rally/.
4 Merlyna Lim, “Freedom to Hate: Social Media, Algorithmic Enclaves, and the Rise 
of Tribal Nationalism in Indonesia,” Critical Asian Studies 49, no. 3 (July 3, 2017): 411–427.
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future of these voluminous Islamic defense actions  when they meet the 
political context? Those questions are a fraction of the focus that will 
be discussed in this article; which is related to the dynamics of religious 
authority amid the development of democracy and technological progress 
in this millennial century.
Social movement, religious authority and propaganda 
The term authority has emerged since the beginning of the social sciences 
discussion. Various definitions in the classical era try to dissect what and 
how authority works in a social system.5 The Weberian classic definition 
of authority is attached to something related to domination (herrschaft). 
Something dominates over something else, individuals dominate over 
other individuals, and groups over other groups. This dominating ability 
is then divided by Weber into three forms; charismatic, traditional and 
legitimate authority. The simplification of this authority will be more 
easily understood when it comes to political studies and power. In its 
development, authority is always juxtaposed with power, meaning 
authority is something inherent with power. Authority is the right to 
act to make a rule, while power is understood as the ability to force in 
obeying the rule. In essence, authority has an element of rights, values 
and norms that underlie someone to do what he has to do. 6
In the landscape of Islamic studies, issues related to authority are 
still attached to the concept of tripartite authority  proposed by Max 
Weber. They are: first, a charismatic authority that covers matters 
relating to familial and religious. Second, a traditional authority which 
is present in the medieval era, with the characters of patriarchal society, 
patrimonialism and feudalism. Third,  a legal authority  which comes 
5 Max Weber, On Charisma and Institution Building, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1968.
6 Angela Cheater, The Anthropology of Power, London: Routledge, 2003.
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after the political revolution and the social system in the middle ages. 
This legal authority gave birth to a product called the state bureaucracy, 
which  seeks to bridge the interests of society and the interests of the 
authorities. Legal authority is present when law developed in modern 
countries since the mid-19th century along with the democratization 
process in several European countries. According to Weber, these three 
forms of authority are a semi-hierarchical passage. A state will move 
from charismatic authority to powerful religious institutions, then to a 
feudal and patrimonial society resulting from a noble rebellion against 
the religious institutions. Then, the society will move toward the legal 
authority acquired by the democratization and the public’s resistance to 
the feudal and patrimonial social system. 7
Nevertheless, the tripartite authority cannot actually go hierarchically. 
In countries where the spirit of state management is based on majority 
religious values, there is a duality of attitudes between charismatic 
authorities and legal authorities. Sometimes the two authorities go hand 
in hand, and sometimes also led the condition of one of the authorities 
vis-a-vis other authorities. Even the modern social, economic, political 
and legal products, still according to Weber, are often driven by religious 
zeal. Supporting this thesis, Weber attempted to trace with the question 
“why developments in Western European countries are more advanced 
and financially ripe ahead of the neighboring states of Eastern Europe?” 
Weber argues that progress in western European countries is due to 
bureaucracy and good state administration and other private sectors. 
This good bureaucracy and administration is recognized as weber is the 
product of the spirit of societal capitalism pursuing the acceleration 
of production, in which the acceleration of production forces one to 
be followed by clear administration and bureaucracy for the validity 
7 Weber, On Charisma and Institution Building.
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of the calculation of capitalistic products. Then, how can the soul of 
Western European society’s capitalism be too strong? Weber believes 
that capitalism is driven by Protestant ethics that reject world misery and 
poverty (as God’s absolute destiny) as any other Catholic Church dogma. 
The meeting point between capitalism and Protestantism, according to 
Weber, is the spirit of liberation of scripture interpretation of human 
behavior in the World, especially in the field of respect for human capital. 
The practice of indulgences abused by the Catholic Church authorities 
encouraged Marthin Luther to reinterpret the indulgences. Salvation 
does not stick to Church approval alone; men must seek salvation from 
a different path. Protestants should look for other signs that show that 
they are safe. The result, the worldly order became one of the signs and 
measures of salvation. The more capital one has, the greater opportunity 
one gain to help others and bring people to safety. This Protestant ethic 
developed after the reform of Church authorities in Western Europe. 8
Religious authority in Islam is certainly different from the hierarchical 
Catholic Church authority. Therefore, the function of the mosque does 
not have strong authority as in the church tradition of Christians. The 
authoritative source of Muslim society is very diverse and not monopolized 
by mosque Imams, nor hierarchical power derived from the holy land 
(Mecca). In Indonesia, Islamic religious authority is in some institutions. 
As the largest Islamic mass organization, Nahdhatul Ulama (NU) and 
Muhammadiyah are authoritative institutions in shaping the religious 
acts of Muslim society in Indonesia. At the State level, the Indonesian 
Council of Ulama is present as a reflection of the state on the authority 
of the decisions of Islamic religious affairs through its fatwa. In addition, 
the Ministry of Religious Affairs takes the position of authority in the 
field of “administration of religions”. In smaller scope, Islamic religious 
8 Max Weber, The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, New York: Scribner, 1958.
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authorities are grasped by institutions and some other non-mainstream 
individuals such as Sufi traditions, Political Islam, and informal-local 
Islamic leaders spread across many regions of Indonesia. 9
Social movement becomes an interesting theory to dissect how an action 
works for a particular purpose. The Islamic Defense Action has considerable 
relevance when viewed in the frames of social movements. Social movement 
is one of the discussions in political studies. In contemporary discussions, 
social movements show how society demands a change by taking action in 
mobilized masses. The unique characteristic of social movements is that 
their movement is guided in their intention and strategy (purposively and 
strategically), by the cross-community that participates in the movement. 
In addition, social movements appear massively outside the established 
political or institutional channels within a country. 10 Social movement is 
closely related to a shared ideal and responds to a political power. Sidney 
Tarrow presents three big puzzles related to social movements and socio-
political conditions: first, what conditions bring the power of the movement 
can emerge; Second, how the dynamics of movement that can perpetuate 
the power of the movement; third, what sorts of social outcomes or the 
effects and impacts of such social movements. The three puzzles brought 
Tarrow to several theories for further exploration. Tarrow insisted that 
one of the key answers to the puzzle was political opportunity (a political 
opportunity, a social movement increased when it gained the support of 
resources and successfully mobilized the resource.) When the political 
opportunity structure was open, social movement actors used elite support 
in the system. This becomes one of the variables driving the progress of 
the social movement to form a force. The structure of political opportunity 
9 Azyumardi Azra, Kees van Dijk, and Nico J. G. Kaptein, Varieties of Religious Authority: 
Changes and Challenges in 20th Century Indonesian Islam, Singapore: Institute of Southeast 
Asian Studies, 2010.
10 Hank Johnston, What Is a Social Movement? UK: John Wiley & Sons, 2014.
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will help a study of social movements by explaining  how the actors of the 
movement merge in a collective action and network between one social 
group with another social group to voice the purpose of action. This is 
called by Tarrow as a seizing and making opportunity, using and forming 
political opportunities through social movement actors.11 Peter Eisinger 
sees and compares this political opportunity to two political conditions: 
closed and open condition. Eisinger wants to know if  the protests and the 
emergence of various social movements are caused by political conditions 
that are under pressure or in openness? Eisinger concluded that just as state 
institutions are open, protests from the social movement are increasing. 12
In a movement, mobilization becomes a way to add strength, at least 
in mass quantity. The development of social movements is also largely 
determined by how large and powerful the resources are and whether 
the resources are mobilized appropriately. Tarrow explains that for the 
mobilization process and the mobilization object are used appropriately, 
there are three important elements that must be run symbiotically in 
social movements, namely formal organization, mobilizing structure, 
and organization of collective action. Tarrow says actors of mobilization 
structures in a movement must be internalized in two other ways 
controlled by high-level leaders, 13 in other terms, those who have the 
legitimacy of power or charismatic leaders.
In launching an action, there needs to be propaganda to awaken the soul 
of the collectivism of other societies in order to agree with the discourses 
echoed in the social movement. Propaganda becomes an important 
part in spreading a massive discourse to achieve a goal. Theoretically, 
11 Sidney Tarrow, Power in Movement: Social Movements and Contentious Politics, New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 1998.
12 Peter K. Eisinger, “The Conditions of Protest Behavior in American Cities,” The 
American Political Science Review, Vol. 67. No.1. (1972).
13 Sidney Tarrow, Power and Movement..., 136.
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propaganda studies evolve from the historiography narrative of dictatorial 
government to the sciences of mass communication discussions that are 
often defined as attempts to shape influence, change, and control the 
attitudes and opinions of a person or group for a particular purpose 
or to be brought in a particular direction. Propaganda as a political 
strategy must have been used long before the modern era. However, 
the development of propaganda as a scientific study began to be heavily 
discussed after World War I. Indeed, the 1990s have been called “the 
century propaganda” and “the age of propaganda”. When the world war 
raged, all parties involved in the onslaught of war tactics and tactics to 
weaken the opponent. An ongoing study of hate propaganda is discussed 
when it is considered one of the most effective tactics to strengthen 
defense and weaken the opposing side. 14
Paradigm turn: from offline to online activism
In the past, propaganda messages were always present in the pages of 
newspapers, free flyers taped to the walls of city buildings. Propaganda is 
present as a representation of a political ideology it embraces an essential 
trinity: rhetoric, myth and symbolism. Rhetoric, symbolism and myth 
are a trinity that relates to each other in running propaganda programs. 
Good rhetoric becomes the beginning of public interest in digesting an 
idea. Therefore, world leaders in the era of world war are always known 
for their rhetorical ability delivered through state speeches; Adolf Hitler, 
Winston Churchill, Harry S, Turman, Mussolini, Josef Stalin, Franklin 
D Roosevelt. Even Sukarno of Indonesia has always been known for his 
fiery speech. Meanwhile symbols are another component in this trinity. 
14 Stanley B. Cunningham, The Idea of Propaganda: A Reconstruction, USA: Greenwood 
Publishing Group, 2002; Edward Bernays, Propaganda, New York: Ig Publishing, 2005; 
see Nicholas J. O’Shaughnessy, Politics and Propaganda: Weapons of Mass Seduction UK: 
Manchester University Press, 2004.
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The symbol in this case is not merely a visualized image; it can be a 
person, photo, wise quotes, or anything that can be seen to represent the 
abstraction of an object, idea,and purposes. Symbols become a universal 
language that can be understood even by different cultures. Symbols can 
also last forever; in which the old symbols are able to be reproduced 
for the sake of new ideas and ideas that were born later. The last trinity 
component in propaganda is myth. Myth does not mean stories related 
to ancient cultural traditions or mythological tales. Myth here means a 
short message that is always told over and over again to achieve a certain 
goal. In this case, the stereotype is myth in propaganda. 15
In other fields, religious leaders take on the role of propagandists 
of religious values. Indonesia as a country with a majority Muslim 
population has thousands of activities that seek to propagate Islam as 
a way of life. This propaganda activity is pursued by the various ways 
and unique character of each group. In two major Islamic organizations 
mainstream in Indonesia; Muhammadiyah and NU are representing the 
Sunnism. As the established Islamic mass organization, Muhammadiyah 
and NU nowadays are the authoritative institution in propagating the 
ahlussunnah wal jamāah practices in Indonesia16 
The rapid development of the world of technology and information 
make propaganda adapt the context of the development. Post-World War 
II, propaganda is not merely a government monopoly to give confidence 
to its people against the enemies of the state. Propaganda appears more 
intense by small groups with other group ideological opponents. Moreover, 
with the development of the mass media industry has spawned a new 
style of propaganda with tools, ways, and models tailored to the context 
of technological developments. In the Reformation era in Indonesia, 
15 O’Shaughnessy, Politics and Propaganda.
16 Asfa Widiyanto, Religious Authority and the Prospects for Religious Pluralism in Indonesia: 
The Role of Traditionalist Muslim Scholars, Berlin: LIT Verlag Münster, 2016.
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propaganda is also often done not only by the government, but also by 
social movements that echo multiple identities; be it a primordial identity 
of ethnicity, religion, political ideology and profession.
Technological developments have influenced many social and political 
dimensions. In the field of information, technological developments 
simultaneously arouse the spirit of massive information dissemination. 
In the mid-19th century, various information and political activities 
were spread through newspapers printed on the press of the industrial 
revolution machine, after which technology grew rapidly until the media 
was able to visualize the information in its entirety; namely television. 
However, some of the information media is certainly not accessible to 
everyone because the price is not affordable, only among investors who 
can act through the media information. The limitations of the media in 
this political arena are judged to be contrary to the democracy values  that 
allow anyone to actively participate in political activities and voice the 
aspirations of the government.
The 1980s became the beginning for the revival of more friendly 
and affordable information media for democratic societies. Here comes 
the Internet as a new information medium. Over the course of the past 
decade, the internet has penetrated into the broader layers of society. 
The range of network-based services is booming like BITNET (because 
it’s time to network) and CSNET (Computer Science Network) that 
provides e-mail services. Along with the development of services gathered 
in cyberspace, then born a new community that may not necessarily meet 
in the real world, but intensely communicate in cyberspace;that is virtual 
communities.17 Some changes in information and technology will give 
birth to new nuances in propaganda programs and social movements. 
17 Howard Rheingold, The Virtual Community: Homesteading on the Electronic Frontier, 
London: MIT Press, 2000.
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Activists should move on to new propaganda styles with less risk; be 
it social or financial risks of financial risk. By switching to the online 
paradigm, propaganda is easier to do because it is based on the internet. 
The Internet is a device that is rated convivial; cheaper in terms of 
financing and more formally distributed. 18
The shift of the paradigm of activists to propaganda instantly through 
technology tools also changed the authoritative source in propaganda. 
In previous eras - especially in authoritarian regimes prior to the 
reformation era in Indonesia - the state was an authoritative source for 
social campaigning. The state is the only one that can legitimize whether 
propaganda is good or bad to do. In the case of Indonesia, the Ministry of 
Information became the mouthpiece of the government in propaganda. 
What is reported by the media in Indonesia, must have been approved 
by the Ministry of Information and legitimately spread by word of mouth 
by other communities. Not just news, the Ministry of Information must 
foster a variety of theatrical art to fit the vision and mission of the New 
Order government and become one of the government’s propaganda 
mouthpieces. Government propaganda is voiced by various arts languages 
such as ludruk, Longser wayang kulit or leather puppets, Ondel-Ondel 
on the island of Java, and Mamanda in Kalimantan. Various art groups 
are directly guided by the Directorate of People’s Information, Ministry 
of Information. Since the Information Department was abolished by the 
government of President Abdurrahman Wahid, these folk art groups 
has been fading followed by the fading of the government’s propaganda 
funnel through some cultural arts.19
After the fall of the New Order regime, the social movements of the 
18 Merlyna Lim, “@rchipelago Online: The Internet and Political Activism in Indonesia”, 
Ph.D Thesis (Twente, 2005).
19 Mahdiduri Mahdiduri, Ubrug; Tontonan dan Tuntunan, Dinas Pendidikan Propinsi 
Banten & Lembaga Keilmuan dan Kebudayaan Nimus Institut, 2010.
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people increased significantly. Democracy brings a fresh breeze to the 
variety of identities to appear in public, the demonstration becomes a 
frequent political phenomenon. Demonstrations have an important role 
in public prosecution of political elites. On a large scale, this demonstration 
can culminate into a social movement with mass mobilization capable of 
mobilizing from various parts of Indonesia. According to Lim, social media 
has played an important role in facilitating successful mass mobilization 
through what she calls as social media activism.20 Islamic Defense Action 
is one of the big actions that claimed to bring millions of people from 
various regions. The significant question is why are they willing and 
able to be present in the mass movement in Jakarta? Meanwhile the 
cost to attend the action is certainly not small for those who come from 
outside Jakarta, especially those coming from outside the island of Java. 
In the case of voluminous Islamic Defense Action, the participants of 
the action came from various regions of Indonesia.  data for this article 
is collected from direct interviews with some of the participants of the 
action, and the process of movement is then categorized with various 
variants; ranging from social media campaigns, simultaneous movements 
in various regions, to mass mobilization centered on one point namely 
the National Monument in Jakarta.
In the early action of October 14, 2016, the protest movement against 
Ahok’s speech was only done in the city hall area of  DKI Jakarta. In this 
first action, a single command is on the Islamic Defenders Front (FPI), 
headed by a figure who is currently claimed to be the high priest of the 
Muslims; Habib Rizieq Syihab. In their demands, the masses want the 
legal process to run quickly against Ahok who considered blaspheming 
Islam. A few weeks after the first action, the process of settling the cases 
20 Merlyna Lim, “Many Clicks but Little Sticks: Social Media Activism in Indonesia,” 
Journal of Contemporary Asia 43, No. 4 (2013): 636-657.
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of blasphemy is considered to be running slowly. So the discourse about 
the legal process re-voiced through various social media. As a result, 
the message of action discourse widespread that led to follow-up action 
on November 4, 2016. In this second action, mass movement spread 
in various regions in Indonesia; Medan, Solo, Samarinda, Balikpapan, 
other cities. The next action was centered in Jakarta involving millions 
of people from all over Indonesia. Participants come from various 
backgrounds, ages and professions. In organizing the masses, supporters 
of Islamic Defense Movement throughout the cities form sporadic 
organizations which started from various gathering like majlis taklim, 
campus organization and other religious associations. Their espousal in 
the Islamic Defense Movement make themselves join the group. They 
also create online social media groups to facilitate the arrangement of 
departure to Jakarta with a variety of funding sources; be it self-financing 
and sponsorship. Several supporters of the Islamic Defense Movement 
acknowledged that they were voluntary and without compulsion to pay 
for attending the national movement, even among them had to set aside 
money for snack because they are still active students in several public 
and private universities.21
Community participation from various regions cannot be separated 
from the role of online social media as a strategy of mass mobilization 
and dissemination of discourse.22 The key actors of the Islamic Defense 
Action succeed in influencing the masses through short messages, 
memes and propaganda images by relying on the internet. In Indonesia, 
the use of the Internet as a medium of political activism has grown since 
21 Interview with some Islamic Defense Movement supporters in several cities; Samarinda, 
Balikpapan and Solo
22 Lim, however, noted that not all social media activism successfully gained support 
from the public; see her case studies on succesfull (KPK and Prita Case) and unsucessfull 
social media activisms (Lapindo and Ahmadiyya Case) in Lim, “Many Clicks,” 640-652.
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the 1990s. For the first time, mailing lists from e-mail providers were 
created to mobilize the masses who wanted to reform the power of the 
New Order regime. Therefore, the reform of 1998 cannot be separated 
from the discussion of the development of the internet. In the field of 
religious social, in the case of Laskar Jihad, the internet also managed 
to mobilize the religious army to go into the conflict field in Ambon, 
Indonesia, about dozens of people successfully mobilized via the internet 
available in internet network stalls (Indonesian:Warnet). In addition, the 
internet makes it easy for Laskar Jihad main actors to gain access from 
al-Qaeda and Jama’ah Islamiyah (JI), a network of radically developed 
early groups in the Middle East. Although the cooperation was rejected 
by Ja’far Umar Thalib as laskar leader, but in this case has proved that 
the internet is able to facilitate activists to network and create new public 
spaces in carrying out their political intentions.23
Why are they willing to volunteer to go and follow the Islamic Defense 
Action? Indeed, one of the uniqueness of the religious movement is its 
volunteeristic stance. However, when viewed from the theory of social 
movements that they still feel as a militant movement that has some basic 
things that should be nurtured (basic properties of movements). Basic 
properties of movement are usually collective challenges that make them 
interrupt, obstructing and opposing together, aimed at the activities of 
other groups that do not have ideologies like them, or attitudes that 
are considered contrary to Islam. Another fundamental is the common 
purpose, which is used to achieve the interests of the group. The common 
goal is the reason for mass networks taking risks to act collectively in 
the name of group solidarity, that is, a sense of equal struggle within 
a community. In addition, a militant movement has a collective action 
defense. They must be able to defend the group from various challenges 
23 Lim, “@rchipelago Online.”
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by taking advantage of whatever opportunities are present around them.24 
The Islamic Defense Action illustrates how social movements have 
dynamic interplay with the movement of online activism in the form of 
ideological discourse propaganda spread through online social media.
New trend, new strategy and new actors 
Some Islamic social movements become interesting to study because 
of the dialectics between the minds of Islamic and secular countries. 
Muslim countries are always faced with a dilemmatic attitude; between 
establishing religious norms on the one hand, and applying modern and 
secular values  in the frame of the nation-state on the other.25 Moreover, 
after the Arab Spring that almost hit all of the Arab countries, Indonesia 
and Turkey have become models of how the mind of religious state 
can fight with the mind of secular state without serious conflict. In 
other cases, Morocco became a much-watched country because of the 
massive process of the protest movement that brought Morocco into the 
constitutional reform, but without experiencing the fall of the regime and 
the victims in large numbers.26 All the social movements that occurred 
in the millennial have different characteristics from the earlier social 
movements. The only difference lies in the strategies used by activists, 
namely by using the internet. This pattern of Internet links and social 
24 Sidney Tarrow, Power in Movement,. 3-5.
25 More discussions about this issue can be read from some following studies Mark 
Juergensmeyer, The New Cold War? Religious Nationalism Confronts the Secular State, California: 
University of California Press, 1993; Benjamin Barber, Jihad vs. McWorld: Terrorism’s Challenge 
to Democracy, New York: Random House Publishing Group, 2010; John L. Esposito and John 
Obert Voll, Islam and Democracy, USA: Oxford University Press, 1996; Asep Muhammad 
Iqbal and Zulkifli Zulkifli, “Islamic Fundamentalism, Nation- State and Global Citizenship: 
The Case of Hizb Ut-Tahrir,” Indonesian Journal of Islam and Muslim Societies 6, no. 1 (June 
1, 2016): 35–61; John Keane, Global Civil Society? (UK: Cambridge University Press, 2003).
26 Ibnu Burdah, “Morocco Protest Movements in the Post-Constitutional Reform,” 
Indonesian Journal of Islam and Muslim Societies 7, no. 2 (December 1, 2017): 201–219.
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movements can be divided into two types of internet-based activism and 
internet-supported activism. Internet-supported activism is an activism 
that uses the internet as a supporting medium of a movement. The 
existence of the Internet does not bring great influence in the pattern 
of activism like this. Meanwhile internet-based activism is an activism 
that really rests its movement on internet media such as “bomb like and 
email”, online petitions and protest websites.27 These two typologies of 
online activism can be a massive movement if the voiced action relates to 
the greatly managed country narrative.28 The dynamic interplay between 
activism and online activism has become a trend that occurs almost in 
every sphere of activism. Micah White calls this trend of activism the 
term “clicktivism”, the acronym between the word “click” as a virtual 
activity, and “activism” as a political movement and identity. The term 
began to be widely used after popularization by Micah White when he 
made the Occupy Wall Street (OWS) protest movement in mid-2011 in 
the United States. This movement is increasingly done by the community 
thanks to the ease of accessing technology. Despite being an effective and 
efficient trend in voting for the aspirations of the public, White realizes 
that clicktivism actually hampers the “leftist” fighting power as the front 
guard against the hegemony of political elites. Clicktivism only seeks to 
quantify empathy for a discourse without emphasizing real participation. 
Activists seek to mobilize votes online to gain support from the global 
community, so success can be measured by tracking how much “click” 
or online support is received from a discourse published through online 
social media.29
27 Jeroen Van Laer and Peter Van Aelst, “Internet and Social Movement Action 
Repertoires: Opportunities and Limitations,” Information, Communication & Society 13, no. 8 
(December 2010): 1146–1171.
28 Muzayyin Ahyar, “Islamic Clicktivism: Internet, Democracy and Contemporary 
Islamist Activism in Surakarta,” Studia Islamika vol 24, no. 3 (December 31, 2017): 435–468.
29 Micah White, The End of Protest: A New Playbook for Revolution, Canada: Knopf Canada, 
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In Indonesia, this model of clicktivism is also used by some Islamic 
movements in voicing religious identity. The Islamic Defense Action 
always throws religion (Islam) versus state discourse online in various 
social media. In fact, the voiced discourse is laden with the ideology of 
Islamism that wants Islam to be a comprehensive way of life that include 
in the socio-economic-political-culture and not just a ritual of worship. 
However, the ideology of Islamism present in Indonesia has transformed 
into post-Islamism, the critical discourse that arises in responding to 
Islamism which is considered too conservative and not contextual with 
the development of the times. Post-Islamism describes Islamism that 
adapts to modern political styles, democracy and human rights. The 
trends of the phenomenon of Islamism towards post-Islamism have 
occurred in various Muslim worlds - including Indonesia - in the form 
of political parties, mass organizations, interest groups and even social 
movements.30 These discourses are propagated through social media by 
multiple support accounts in various forms; hash tag, memes, photos and 
videos. Social media accounts which are mostly used by the crowds are: 
Instagram, Facebook, and Twitter which each has its own peculiarities in 
terms of application features and community users. On Facebook’s social 
media, the discourse is voiced through dozens of pages titled “Aksi Bela 
Islam”. Most followers of the dozens of pages are Islamic defense action 
with user @aksibelaislamalquran with 21,000 more followers and like. 
This facebook page began to voice propaganda related to Islamic defend 
on November 6, 2016 by posting status from one Indonesia’s leading 
preacher.
Furthermore, this Facebook page has always been active in voicing 
Islamic propaganda through the status and pictures regarding the 
2016.
30 Asef Bayat, Post-Islamism: The Changing Faces of Political Islam, New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2013.
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government policy, social conditions, political activities and various other 
things that are considered “detrimental to Islam”. Twitter which is the 
pioneer of social media of using hash tag has the privilege in spreading 
propaganda by looking at the top trend of the word being discussed in 
“tweet” by the “tweeple”. The current Twitter app is less favored by young 
people because they see it has many shortcomings such as character 
limits written for a status or photo caption. Currently, netizens prefer 
Instagram because it has a more convenient and friendly feature used 
in campaigning for agenda. These three online social media became a 
promising forum for Islamic propagandists in Indonesia in launching 
religious propaganda because it is very potential to be consumed by 
cyber activists. This statement is corroborated by the results of research 
conducted by We Are Social claiming that Indonesia -- a country with the 
3rd largest social media user after Saudi Arabia and India, ranked 4th in 
the world of the people who spend time with the internet  and ranked 
1st in Southeast Asia. 31 Since hash tag became applicable in social media 
Facebook, traces of discussion about the Action of Islamic Defense and 
the discourse of Islamism is easy to trace. The Islamic activists voiced 
their propaganda by hunting down into a trending topic of discussion on 
an online social media. They campaign for something by emblazoning 
a mark at the beginning of the word as a message that is easily grouped 
in cyberspace networks. Islamic Defense Action has a uniform hash 
tag written #aksibelaislam, another hash tag that becomes Islamic 
propaganda is # spirit212. The propaganda is spelled out by personal and 
group-created accounts. In early 2018, Muslim Cyber  Army was heavily 
discussed because it is considered to be a source of negative propaganda 
that always spread the sentiments of tribe, religion, races, and interclass 
31 “Digital in 2018: World’s Internet Users Pass the 4 Billion Mark - We Are Social 
UK,” accessed June 22, 2018, https://wearesocial.com/uk/blog/2018/01/global-digital-
report-2018.
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(SARA). The Muslim Cyber  Army is one of the social phenomena of how 
propaganda is rolling in society, which is capable of generating a new 
authority in introducing ideas, groups and actors who are considered 
more authoritative in giving an understanding of Islam.
Table1. hashtag of Islamist propaganda in online Social media
SOCIAL 
MEDIA
PROPAGANDA 
SYMBOLS
ACCOUNT/FAN PAGE/GROUP 
ACCOUNT  & MOST SUPPORTERS
Facebook - Aksi Bela Islam [Islamic 
Defense Action]
- #belaquran 
[#defendquran]
- #belaulama 
[#defendulama]
- #spirit212 [#212spirit]
- #aksibelaislam 
[#islamicdefenseaction]
Aksi Bela Islam (@aksibelaislamalquran)
- 21.292 people like
- 21.738 people follow  
Twitter Aksi 212 (@RemajaIslam212)
- 3481 followers 
Instagram - #aksibelaislam (121.069 post)
- Aksi Bela Islam (bela.islam). 15300 
followers.
- Cyber Muslim Community 
(cybermuslimcommunity). 48300 
followers. 619 posts
- Cyber Army Muslim (cyber.army.
muslim) 18200 followers, 1225 posts
- #2019gantipresiden 
(muslimcyberarmy_id2) 12400 
followers, 559 posts
The Islamic Defense Action has not only cultivated Islamic messages, 
jargon and propaganda in the social media; it has also spawned actors 
who have the role in spreading Islamic propaganda in the social media 
world. In fact, the Islamic Defense Action cannot be separated from the 
old actors who often roll out the discourses of post-Islamism in Indonesia 
that is Habib Rizieq Shihab.32 At the beginning of the post-Reform 
decade, Habib Rizieq often threw a harsh response to democracy as a 
modern political system. He argued that Islam prioritizes deliberation, 
32 Arie Setyaningrum Pamungkas dan Gita Octaviani, “Aksi Bela Islam dan Ruang 
Publik Muslim: Dari Representasi Daring ke Komunitas Luring,” Jurnal Pemikiran Sosiologi 4, 
No. 2 (Agustus, 2017), 68.
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and deliberations are very different from the meaning of democracy. 
Democracy puts forward the most votes or votes, while deliberations 
put forward the results of an agreement guided by Islamic values. At 
one time, he mentioned that democracy is more dangerous than pigs, 
and democracy is the same as pigs that can be consumed only when 
in a very forced state.33 As the ongoing process of democratization in 
Indonesia continues, Habib Rizieq is now using the tools of democracy 
to launch Islamic propaganda in order to influence political policies that 
are considered to be detrimental to Muslims. This change of perspective 
towards democracy is one of the indications of a change in Islamism’s 
reasoning towards post-Islamism. The Islamic Defense Action can be 
regarded as a manifestation of post-Islamism in the Reformation era.
Besides Rizieq, the growing actor in Aksi Bela Islam is Ustadz Bachtiar 
Nasir. This Islamic figure is an alumnus of Gontor, one of the famous 
modern Islamic boarding schools (pesantren)  located in Ponorogo district 
of East Java province. He then pursued his higher education at the Islamic 
University of Madinah, Saudi Arabia. Bachtiar Nasir’s figure as an activist 
has skyrocketed since the Islamic Defense Action II on November 4, 2016 
where he was asked to become the chairman of the National Movement of 
Fatwa Guard for the Indonesian Council of Ulama’s fatwa (GNPF-MUI). 
Although his track record was as administrators of the Muhammadiyah 
Central Board, the Islamic Defense Action did not present Nasir as a 
picture of Muhammadiyah’s figure.34 In addition to Nasir, another figure 
who appears during the Islamic Defense Action was Ustadz Abdul Somad. 
Abdul Somad is basically not a figure directly involved in the voluminous 
33 “Habib Rizieq: Demokrasi Lebih Bahaya Dari Babi,” Arrahmah.Com, n.d., accessed 
June 28, 2018, https://www.arrahmah.com/2013/04/02/habib-rizieq-demokrasi-lebih-
bahaya-dari-babi/; “Habib Rizieq: Perbedaan Islam Dan Demokrasi,” accessed June 28, 
2018, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OkhNjm8ur7I.
34 Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict, “After Ahok: The Islamist Agenda in 
Indonesia,” IPAC Report No. 44 (6 April 2018), 4-8.
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Islamic Defense Action. However, the momentum of the Islamic Defense 
Action coincided with the viral da`wah videos of Ustadz Abdul Somad in 
late 2016. Some of his video clips are often cited for propaganda support 
for the jargon of the Islamic Defense Action movement such as the Bela 
al-Quran Action, spirit 212, and others.
Ustadz Bachtiar Nasir and UstadzAbdul Somad are two figures who 
are currently often featured in the internet world. Digital record of these 
two figures is very easy to get. Through the Google search engine, the 
keyword “Ustadz Bachtiar Nasir” will generate approximately 727,000 
relevant topics from various websites. Keywords for “Ustadz Abdul 
Somad” generates 17 million more topics. In terms of quantity,  search 
results online of these two figures actually beat the mainstream Islamic 
organizations figures like Said Aqil Siradz, Mustofa Bisri, Haidar Nashir, 
Syafi’i Ma’arif which display results of about 300,000 related topics. On 
the website of Youtube, there are about 780,000 videos featuring Ustadz 
Abdul Somad’ figure.35
Again responding to a previously asked question about whether 
a large quantity of occurrences in various online media can make the 
figure an authoritative source for shaping the religiosity of Indonesian 
community and spreading massive religious propaganda? Currently, the 
authority of institutions that play a role in shaping the attitude of the 
Islamic community of Indonesia is not yet able to move from Islamic mass 
organizations and various traditional religious institutions that have been 
present since the era of independence and even earlier. Muhammadiyah 
and Nahdhatul Ulama have many grassroots from various educational 
institutions ranging from Islamic boarding schools and high schools 
to university. These two mainstream organizations in Indonesia are 
still influencing the religious character (Islam) in Indonesia with the 
35 According to search results in google search engine in 25th of April 2019
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spread of its members in various state institutions that can influence 
government policy in Indonesia. However, this Islamic clicktivism has 
become a growing trend in the grassroots community as a new social 
movement and bringing in new actors. The blast of Islamic clicktivism is 
the mouthpiece of propaganda of new Islamic figures in the digital age 
and enables the future trajectory for the birth of new Islamic religious 
character in Indonesia in the future.
Conclusion: The Future of Aksi Bela Islam 
The Islamic Defense Action has left traces of online activism on the 
Islamic social movement in Indonesia. Within the framework of the 
new social movement, the existence of Islamic Defense Action can clarify 
some matters relating to socio-political phenomena. First, the Islamic 
Defense Action is one of the consequences of the post-democratization 
of the society polarization, whereby the struggle for public space is getting 
bigger and free. This polarization leads to the disintegration of the 
mainstream concentration of authoritative Islamic religious movements; 
Muhammadiyah and Nahdhatul Ulama in shaping the religious 
pattern for the majority of Muslims in Indonesia. One of the signs of 
the weakening of Muhammadiyah and NU in establishing itself as an 
authoritative Islamic mass is by the emergence of new actors in the Islamic 
Defense Action in volumes. These actors appear by not carrying flags of 
mainstream Islamic Organizations. The arising some new actors in / and 
after Islamic defense action describes the growing trend of flourishing 
new authoritative figure who believed to be the source of propaganda in 
terms of Islam and Indonesian-ness. Secondly, the Islams defense action 
strengthens the previous scholars’ thesis on Dynamic Interplay beetween 
offline and online activism. The sympathizers of the Islam defense 
action use clicktivism as a social movement’s success strategy.  Islamic 
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clicktivism is used for an action that can be measured its success in terms 
of virtual (online) and real (offline). The offline social movement will 
be led to the assumption that  Islamic social movements will potentially 
succeed if it brings up national interest issues and the diverse elements 
of society that participate in an action. Ultimately, the Islamic Defense 
Action is a new trend that is a consequence of dynamic contestation 
between Islamic identity and modern democratic values  that seem vis a 
vis in the public sphere. This post-democratization religious contestation 
in Indonesia also raises a new religious authority that plays the role of 
Islamic social movements outside mainstream Islamic organizations in 
Indonesia. The new actors who emerged after the Islamic Defense Action 
became a source of Islamic propaganda in which their actions, direction 
and speech were considered the authority representing Islam entirely. 
The attitude of the new actors is then disseminated with cliktifism as a 
strategic step for the success of activism in the online world and offline. 
This Islamic activism will always color the contestation of identity in 
post-Islamism era, especially in the political moments in Indonesia.
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